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Book Review
Anti-Dumping Law in a Liberal Trade Order, by Richard Dale. New York, St.
Martin's Press, 1981, 237 pp., $22.50.
Under the sponsorship of the Trade Policy Research Centre in London,
Richard Dale, a lecturer in finance at the University of Bath in England, has
written a lucid and concise analysis of the origins and application of
antidumping law. He summarizes the law and policy not only of the United
States, but of Canada and the European Community as well. He then
compares these laws with the multilateral antidumping accord reached under
the aegis of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
Dale's work should be a worthy addition to the libraries of all lawyers
and economists concerned with international trade matters. Indeed, the U.S.
trade case litigator, as well as government official, will find it an invaluable
reference work, covering, for example, the treatment under the various
antidumping laws of below cost sales and centrally planned economies, as
well as summarizing many of the most significant injury determinations in
the last two decades.
It is a central thesis of Dale's study that national and international
antidumping laws lack solid intellectual foundations and are generally in
direct conflict with the precepts of welfare economics. In particular, he
stresses that price discrimination can be procompetitive, particularly where
there are collusive arrangements in the importing country's domestic market
or where a situation of apparent natural monopoly prevails. Further, Dale
properly observes that dumping of raw materials or intermediate goods must
necessarily benefit producers in the importing country at the expense of their
competitors throughout the world.
As a result of these considerations, Dale asserts that antidumping laws
should be repealed, but, somewhat off-handedly, does acknowledge the
political difficulties in doing so. In this context he refers simply to the
redistributive effects of low-priced imports without also specifying the social
and political costs that such effects can have, particularly in a labor-intensive
industry. Had Dale discussed these latter effects in greater detail, the
legislator, to say nothing of the reader of this book, would have been in a
better position to evaluate the worth of current antidumping policies.
Unwisely, Dale does not suggest that repeal of antidumping laws be
conditioned on obtaining freer access to the markets of those nations whose
exporters are most frequently accused of dumping. Moreover, Dale does not
discuss the economic and political implications of what may be the evolving
merger of concerns relating to dumping with those of government subsidiza-
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tion. For example, since the late 1970s the focus of complaints on European
steel imports to the United States is not that they are dumped as such but
that they are sold below cost of production as a result of pervasive
government subsidization, which is a form of dumping only recently
recognized under GATT and national laws.
By way of background Dale correctly demonstrates that the political
origins of antidumping laws lie in allegations of predatory behavior. He also
correctly notes that the same obtains for domestic price discrimination laws,
e.g., the U.S. Robinson-Patman Act.
Dale likewise correctly demonstrates that the predatory pricing is rare,
simply because it can seldom represent rational commercial behavior, viz.
there is no guarantee that a predatory pricing strategy can secure a
monopoly position for a period sufficient to compensate for the losses incurred
while pricing below marginal cost. Among other things there is little
certainty that, after a firm has achieved a giant market share through
predatory pricing, the firm can keep potential foreign or domestic competi-
tion at bay, can prevent upstream vertical integration by customers, or can
prevent government intervention in the market, any of which would impair
the new monopolists' ability to change supra-normal profits. As a result, Dale
concludes that the concerns of legislators dealing with perceived predatory
dumping have been largely quixotic.
Dale then argues that the application of laws against dumping is,
however, more than an irrelevance. Antidumping provisions have, in their
implementation, become an impediment to international trade and a
consequent threat to the liberal trade order because they are used to curtail
competition in closed national markets. Dale should, however, have stressed
that the antidumping laws are but one of a plethora of such non-tariff
barriers, only some of which were covered in the Tokyo Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations (MTN).
Further, because the antidumping laws and opinions are so vague, Dale
concludes that they provide little guidance as to what future conduct is
lawful. To the government official administering such laws, much less to the
private practitioner, this comment seems indisputable. Thus, in Dale's view,
the deterrent effect of the antidumping laws operates inefficiently.
Dale does acknowledge that. a case can be made for the antidumping
laws. First, there is a "felt need" for such laws related to popular concerns of
fairness; here is where Dale could and' should have stressed the government
subsidy point. Second, antidumping actions provide a political safety valve;
here Dale could and should have discussed further the economic and human
costs resulting from a major market penetration by dumped imports, as well
as by basic shifts in comparative advantage. Unfortunately, the costs of such
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competition, fair or unfair, are rarely borne equally throughout the
importing nation.
Dale observes that antidumping laws persist in part because producer
interests in the importing country are likely to be better organized and
therefore politically more effective than consumer interests. Presumably
Dale must concede that if major change in world attitudes toward dumping
are to occur, this balance of political power must change. But he offers no
suggestions on how such change could be accomplished.
Recognizing the need for some medium for curtailing rapid import
penetration, Dale argues that national action taken under the justification of
a reformed GATT Article XIX, the escape clause provision, is to be preferred
as a safety valve. As a safety valve, however, the escape clause may well, at
least in the U.S., be perceived as an inadequate replacement.
The U.S. escape clause law does permit the imposition of global quotas as
well as tariffs, and even "voluntary" quotas against individual nations, but it
provides only five plus a possible additional three years of relief. In theory,
the escape clause only gives domestic producers a few years to adjust to
increased imports; it contains no mechanism to halt, for example, govern-
ment subsidies. More importantly, U.S. escape clause law has a significantly
higher injury and causality standard than does U.S. antidumping law.
Indeed, as the ITC's November 1980 determination on the automobile escape
clause case suggests, some U.S. industries may perceive difficulties in
obtaining an ITC determination that increased imports were the single most
important cause of injury at a time when they are encountering a cyclical
downturn in domestic demand.
All that having been said, Dale's book is clear, stimulating and useful, as
perhaps befits the author's background as a lawyer, investment banker and
academician. His chapter on the recent history of the application of
antidumping laws to the world steel industry, for example, is a masterful
introduction to the political and economic problems of regulation of
competition, fair and unfair, in an essential industry. For these reasons, and
more, the book should be an essential and handy reference work for the
international trade lawyer practicing in North America or Europe.
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